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The field of environmental ethics has been in discussion and debate the past 40 
years over how to best expand the circle of moral consideration away from a privileged 
human perspective to encompass the rest of the non-human world in order to change minds 
and social practices to address environmental degradation and destruction.  One of the main 
methods is devoted to arguing for the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places as the 
means to do this.   
I argue that this method of environmental ethics because it, at best, is a lazy 
framework for moral deliberation that ignores the entangled sociopolitical and 
environmental complexity of a situation by reducing the answer to a single set of 
predetermined values and interests which (re)produces and reinforces social and 
environmental injustice. An environmental pragmatist approach geared towards addressing 
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 To explore, enjoy and protect the planet. To practice and promote the responsible use of 
the earth's ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and 
restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to 
carry out those objectives. 
 
- Sierra Club mission statement 
 
 
No compromise in the defense of Mother Earth! 
 
- Earth First! slogan 
 
 
…in Wildness is the preservation of the world. 
 
- Henry David Thoreau, “Walking” 
 
 
In God's wildness lies the hope of the world - the great fresh unblighted, unredeemed 
wilderness. The galling harness of civilization drops off, and wounds heal ere we are 
aware. 
 
- John Muir1 
 
 
It seems like every environmental studies class I take tries to make everything about race.  
It’s like, if I wanted to hear this I would take another ethnic studies class. 
 
- anonymous University of Oregon student on Yik Yak 
 
Bad Environmental Ethics and Unethical Environmentalism 
The first four quotes above are fairly famous. Most people who are versed in 
American environmental history and literature or who are nature enthusiasts and activists 
will be able to recognize them or know other works from the authors and would most 
likely identify with their sentiments in some way or another. The last quote, however, is 
                                                 
1 John Muir, John of the Mountains: The Unpublished Journals of John Muir. Edited by Linnie Marsh 
Wolfe. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 317. 
2 
fairly less famous. It was shared by a University of Oregon undergraduate student about 
an environmental studies course through the social media app Yik Yak. Upon an initial 
reading it seems like a rather innocuous statement. It seems to voice a desire for a more 
clear and distinct division between different pressing problems in different fields of 
study; the environment and then society. 
We all know that the environment is in crisis and we must learn about it in order 
to save it. And we all know that there are social and political tensions in this country that 
need to be addressed in order to commit to the historic American vow of freedom and 
justice for all. Each deserves its own separate and focused academic space in order to 
examine these issues that appear to happen in different places and for different reasons. 
We all know what nature is – mountains, forests, deserts, and oceans, national parks, 
preserves, and monuments, the air, water, animals and plants, the climate – and the issue 
is that humans are sullying it out of greed, lack of foresight, and, or because of, lack of 
connection to it. And we all know that social tensions are complicated by histories, 
institutions, people, and power that affect how homes, health, lives, livelihoods, culture, 
and laws are created and organized.  
This description may seem like a rather crude characterization; a forced 
distinction almost. This sentiment shared by a student who is attempting to learn what she 
or he can do to better help the environment, however, in many ways reveals a deep-seated 
and highly problematic philosophical and political position in how academia, policy, and 
the popular environmental narrative approach how to correct the relation between 
humans and the non-human world. The position is this: if the environmental crisis stems 
from a set of anthropocentric beliefs, values, and practices, an environmental ethic that is 
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supposed to correct this must turn towards a value theory that does not privilege the 
human perspective. It demands a theory that takes humans out of the deliberation process 
in order to counterbalance a history of human bias. This sentiment is not just a one-off 
thought shared by a student, an opinion voiced by a young and aspiring environmentalist 
who has an uncomplicated conception of the human-environment relation. In a very 
problematic way it is a standard idea voiced and reinforced by many environmental 
studies programs and students as well as by budding environmental activists, veteran 
activists, influential environmental groups, environmental lawyers, environmental 
protection laws, and professional environmental philosophers.  
This position, of course, seems very well warranted. Commonplace worldwide are 
cases of increasingly contaminated sources of water and air pollution. Hundred-year 
floods, droughts, and storms occur every few years. New and unique cancers due to 
exposure to new and unique chemicals are becoming routine. Ecosystems are 
increasingly breaking down while animal and plant species are increasingly becoming 
endangered with many going extinct. And there are almost daily reminders of the retreat 
and melting of ancient glaciers and continuously rising sea levels. As such, it should take 
little convincing to establish that there is a serious problem with how humans relate to 
non-human lives and non-human places; there is a very serious problem with how most 
humans interact with their environments.  
There are, of course, people who deny that environmental degradation and 
destruction is happening. For the most part, however, the scientific and political debate 
has to do with how and why this is all happening to the environment, who is responsible 
for addressing the problems, and how to address them. Coupled with the fact that there is 
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also a very serious problem with how humans interact with other humans complicates the 
common environmental discourse in that it is not just “the environment” that is being 
harmed. What takes more than a little convincing are the ways in which these problems 
of how humans relate are intertwined. What will take even more convincing for many is 
how certain attempts to address environmental problems completely disregard, if not 
make worse, social and political problems.  
Creating an Environmental Ethic 
There are at least two parallel projects that attempt to engage with how and why 
this is all happening to the environment, who is responsible for addressing the problems, 
and how to address them. While both have roots in an American environmental narrative 
that speaks of Nature, Wilderness, and Wildness and share many of the narrative’s 
intellectual, social, and political commitments, their methods differ quite a bit. One is the 
contemporary environmental movement composed of formal governmental and non-
governmental institutions and informal collective ideas of how to change society to 
reflect and embody better environmental values. Both the mainstream and radical 
versions of the movement seek cultural change with their legal and illegal actions. The 
other is the professional academic field of environmental ethics that uses conceptual 
analysis and philosophical debate to more clearly define the problem and reasons for 
action.  
The professional academic field of environmental ethics responds to these 
environmental crises in the best way it knows how. The project of the field for the past 
several decades has been to discuss, debate, and navigate between competing moral 
theories in order to find out which is best able to identify the source of the problem(s) and 
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then which theory and practice are best able to correct the problem(s). Eric Katz 
describes the field as consisting of two main approaches. One is a conventional approach 
that seeks to find “‘environmentally appropriate’ ethical principles in the direct 
application of traditional ethical theories – such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, rights 
theory, or contractarianism…”2 A more critical approach would “offer a radical 
reinterpretation or critique of the dominant philosophical ideas of the modern age” in 
order to garner the “expansion of ethical thought beyond the limits of the human 
community to include the direct moral consideration of the natural world.”3 
I seek to follow the latter approach; “a critique of the dominant philosophical 
ideas of the modern age”. The conventional approach has been at work for the past forty 
years. For far too long, however, it has been doing ideal theory. The field is stuck on a 
conceptual merry-go-round. Most of its contributors have the privilege of treating the 
project less like a dire and immediate task and more like a puzzle. And while those who 
follow the conventional path work through and slowly piece together the puzzle only to 
tear it apart time and again when the edges do not match up, they forget that while the 
field waits and debates in order to get the ideas right, the world goes on with people 
living their lives in and through the material consequences of environmental (and social) 
degradation.  
I would like to focus my attention on one value theory and framework for 
deliberation in debate within the conventional approach: the intrinsic value of non-human 
lives and places. While there are many conventional approaches as listed above by Katz, I 
                                                 
2 Eric Katz, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation ad Natural Community. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 




will spend time on this one for two reasons. First, within the field and its debates, the 
concept of intrinsic value holds strong conceptual currency in being able to purportedly 
navigate the anthropocentrism/subjectivity problem that concerns most conventional 
ethicists. In other words, they seek a value theory and framework that does not end up 
acquiescing or appealing to human interests in order to navigate environmental problems. 
They seek an objective framework independent of human interests and desires. Second, it 
is the value theory that seems to have the most transferability and holds the most 
currency outside the formal field, namely, in the missions of environmental groups, both 
mainstream and radical, and how it has made its way into environmental policy and 
legislation.  
 In fact, I mean to show that when the concept is put to work in policy and 
legislation, not only does it ignore pre-existing social and political issues that cause, if not 
constitute, environmental issues, it exacerbates the underlying issues perpetuating and 
reinforcing sociopolitical problems. Rather than the concept being a critical approach to 
environmental ethics, it is in fact a conventional approach that, instead of helping 
ameliorate the environmental and social tensions, actually sidesteps the real problem of 
moral deliberation at best, and at worst, only adds to existing social injustice when put to 
work. Rather than leaving a void in the field, however, I will also present an alternative 
that actively works to not sacrifice the health, lives, and livelihoods of the already 
environmentally and socially vulnerable for the sake of protecting an independent and 
distinct state of Nature. I will propose a method that recognizes the complexity of a 
situation and does not reduce problem-framing and solutions to a single set of supposedly 
unquestionable values. It will take as primary that issues of environmental degradation 
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and destruction are also issues of social injustice and that in order to properly address a 
socio-environmental issue, all factors must be given a place in the deliberation process.  
Mapping the Trail 
This thesis will explore with these ideas and their consequences over the course of 
six chapters. This opening chapter has introduced the scope of the discussion – the 
intertwined and contentious intellectual, social, and political history shared between 
environmentalism, environmental ethics, and environmental justice and their 
consequences. It has also spelled out the two main arguments I will make over the course 
of the paper. First, that intrinsic value, as it is most commonly appealed to in 
environmentalist discourse, environmental policy, and in the professional philosophical 
debate should be abandoned because it is at best a lazy foundation for/method of moral 
deliberation that does not actually address the pressing environmental and social 
problems. And because of its lazy moral deliberation, it is at worst and in practice a 
means of exacerbating and reinforcing environmental and social problems.  
Second, in order to address socio-environmental problems without ignoring or 
reinforcing social inequities, the field of environmental ethics should redirect its efforts 
towards the methods of Environmental Pragmatism, specifically the work of Ben Minteer 
and what he calls the “public interest” and the role it must play in order to democratically 
address socio-environmental problems. To buttress the Environmental Pragmatist project 
and temper concerns of anthropocentrism, I will introduce the work of Stacy Alaimo and 
her use of the concept of trans-corporeality in describing the material and bodily relation 
between humans, non-humans, and environments. I hold that doing so will reframe and 
redirect environmental ethics in a way that will contribute to achieving its mission 
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specifically by addressing environmental problems through engaging with social and 
environmental justice issues.  
The first argument will be made through the course of chapters II, III, and IV. 
Chapter II is a brief sketch of the history and current state of the professional 
philosophical debate in environmental ethics and how it describes, appeals to, and uses 
the concept of intrinsic value. It ends with a brief discussion of the gap between the 
theory and practice of the concept. Chapter III and IV work complimentarily, the former 
providing an analysis and critique of intrinsic value to spell out how and why it fails as a 
foundation for/method of moral deliberation. Moreover, with the help of Val Plumwood’s 
work on the mastery of nature and logics of oppression, I hope to point out that the 
concept, instead of doing the work its proponents purport it to do, actually (re)produces 
and reinforces harmful ontological and sociopolitical categories through binary power 
hierarchies. Chapter IV will examine an example where these oppressive hierarchies are 
materialized as social injustices through the operation of the concept in environmental 
policy and law: the application of the Endangered Species Act to the Sacramento River 
Delta Smelt.  
Chapter V will be dedicated to presenting an alternative model and framework by 
spelling out how trans-corporeality can bolster and support Ben Minteer’s focus on the 
“public interest” as a foundation for environmental ethics while also addressing how to 
grapple and temper concerns of anthropocentrism from those who champion strong non-
anthropocentric positions. I call this confluence of Environmental Pragmatism’s methods, 
Minteer’s democratic reframing of environmental ethics, and Alaimo’s framework of 
trans-corporeality “democratic naturalism”.  I will show how “democratic naturalism” 
9 
can succeed where intrinsic value theory fails. It recognizes and takes as central the 
sociopolitical power dynamics of environmental problems by making cases of 
environmental injustice its focal site of inquiry. The concluding chapter will revisit the 
main points of the argument and describe how my proposed method of “democratic 
naturalism” would be applied to the California Delta Smelt case and how it would 




AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM,  
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS,  
AND INTRINSIC VALUE 
This chapter will provide a brief sketch of the history and complexity of the 
professional philosophical debate in environmental ethics, specifically the branch that 
favors non-anthropocentric value theories and how it appeals to, uses, and questions the 
concept of intrinsic value. As mentioned in the introduction, the professional academic 
field, and especially the non-anthropocentric value theory branch, has roots in the broader 
history of the American environmental narrative and imaginary created by and espoused 
through the American nature writing and literature from the past two centuries. While I 
will not argue for this connection in detail in this chapter or any other, what I do hope to 
work through, beginning with this chapter, is the gap between academic theorizing and 
effective application. In short, if the academic project of environmental ethics is the 
contemplative part of the process of environmental problem-solving, the mainstream and 
radical environmental movements are the application of the philosophical and social 
commitments.  
I propose to highlight themes from the broader history of the American 
environmental narrative and imaginary and trace how they provide a foundation for the 
field of environmental ethics. What the field is debating are extensions of these themes, 
especially the work of non-anthropocentric value theorists who champion the argument 
for the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places. After an overview of the debate 
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concerning intrinsic value, I will offer a short discussion concerning the aforementioned 
gap between theory and practice and how to best address it.  
Nature, Wildness, and Wilderness4 
We have already heard from Henry David Thoreau and John Muir and their 
thoughts on the relation between Nature, Wilderness, Wildness, and human civilization. 
Thoreau and Muir are just two members of a long list of authors who have created, 
influenced, and informed concepts and practices of environmental philosophy, 
conservation, preservation, and environmentalism on sociocultural and legal levels. To 
revisit their quotes from the opening: 
“…in Wildness is the preservation of the world.” 
- Henry David Thoreau, “Walking” 
“In God's wildness lies the hope of the world - the great fresh unblighted, unredeemed 
wilderness. The galling harness of civilization drops off, and wounds heal ere we are 
aware.” 
- John Muir5 
Muir echoes Thoreau’s sentiment but with a bit more force in his analysis of the 
relation between Wildness/Wilderness and human civilization. There is something 
purifying about Wildness in Wilderness that preserves the world and heals whoever 
experiences it. God’s power is what makes it “unblighted,” an untainted source of hope 
for the world. These qualities of God’s place and work are all in contrast to “civilization,” 
                                                 
4 My use of “Wildness”, “Wilderness”, and “Nature” is in reference to how it has developed and used by 
the likes of Thoreau and Muir and many others. For a more detailed examination of the terms, please see 
Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind 5th edition. (New Haven, MA: Yale University Press, 
2014). 
 
5 Muir, John of the Mountains, 317. 
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the realm of humans that is a “galling harness,” an infuriating weight that keeps humans 
from being what they should be.   
There is some quality of the Wildness in the Wilderness of Nature that makes it 
special, an importance which should give it primacy over all other interests and 
endeavors. It is only through experiencing the Wildness of Nature in Wilderness that the 
hope of a world better than what “civilization” can provide can survive. And if one is 
familiar and versed in the work of these two authors and other nature writers of the same 
ilk (e.g. Ralph Waldo Emerson and Edward Abbey), the farther and more inaccessible the 
wilderness, the better. And given the special properties of Nature, humans must forgo 
their commercial and industrial ambitions and even self-interest when deciding how to 
interact with Nature. Anyone who wants to profit from Nature by seeing it and using it as 
a mere resource at human disposal has to be either shown how and why Nature has these 
qualities so that they can be revered and respected or forcefully stopped in their utilitarian 
efforts.  
Environmental activist groups channeling Thoreau and Muir who embrace and 
extend the intellectual history of the American environmental imaginary into the present 
express their positions for sociopolitical change through legal actions such as legislative 
reform and legal suits. Examples of major legislation that has been passed in the United 
States that is meant to capture these ideas about nature and operationalize the mission of 
preserving the environment from purely human interests are the establishment of the 
National Parks and the National Park Service in 1916 with their mission to preserve 
natural landscapes and the Wilderness Act in 1964 meant to set aside tracts of land as “an 
area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man 
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himself is a visitor who does not remain.”6 These groups continue to lobby for additional 
legal teeth to these kinds of laws and greater and stronger environmental regulations in 
order to change public and private minds and practices.  
Most major mainstream groups focus on these legal avenues to changing minds 
and practices (e.g. The Sierra Club7, the Natural Resource Defense Council8, and Earth 
Justice9).  Some, however, have a history of less than legal actions such as tree spiking, 
dam exploding, and other “monkey wrenching” that are more radical, destructive, and 
physically harmful approaches to informing and changing the minds and lives of those 
who do not agree with their environmental values (e.g. EarthFirst!10, the Earth Liberation 
Front11, and certain animal rights groups).  
These avenues of environmental legislation and activism are just some of many 
expressions and extensions of an environmental history that speaks of Nature as having 
special properties and values; just one way of describing “why” the environment should 
be protected and “how.” The other avenue of interest for this thesis is the professional 
philosophical field of environmental ethics and how it navigates the relation between 
humans and the non-human world.  
 
 
                                                 
6 16 U.S. C. 1131-1136 (2)(c) 
 
7 slogan: “Explore, Enjoy, and Protect the Planet.” 
 
8 slogan: “The Earth’s Best Defense.”  
 
9 slogan: “Because the Earth Needs a Good Lawyer.”  
 




Exploring Environmental Ethics 
Thoreau and Muir’s poetic and romantic style of arguing for the special properties 
of Nature are hallmarks of the American environmental narrative. Aldo Leopold’s nature 
writing and ecological observations, scientifically poetic in their own right, mark a 
different method of analysis, however, of how the human and non-human world fit 
together. A Sand County Almanac, his posthumously published collection of essays in 
1948, closes with a chapter called the “Land Ethic.” In it Leopold explores a method of 
thinking through how to expand the moral circle of consideration to the more-than-human 
community. In doing so, Leopold opened a new path for academic conceptual framework 
building and value theorizing on how to best address environmental problems. 
Moving forward a few decades to the early 1980’s with J. Baird Callicott and 
Donald Worster, the formal field of environmental ethics “emerged as a new 
subdiscipline of moral philosophy” taking shape as professional philosophers started 
sorting through different value and moral theories that can make better sense of the 
human-nature relation, each faction setting up different camps and picking their 
champion concepts.12 The discussion within the field for the past several decades has 
been about how to best expand the circle of moral consideration away from a privileged 
human perspective – the diagnosed cause of the problem – to encompass parts or the rest 
of the non-human world. In short, how does one begin to temper, neutralize, and correct 
against anthropocentric bias in problem-framing, deliberation, and solutions in order to 
address environmental problems?  
                                                 
12 J. Baird Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 4(October 1984): 299. 
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To revisit Katz’s division of labor in the field, the conventional approach seeks to 
find “‘environmentally appropriate’ ethical principles in the direct application of 
traditional ethical theories – such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, rights theory, or 
contractarianism…”13 while critical approaches would “offer a radical reinterpretation or 
critique of the dominant philosophical ideas of the modern age” in order to garner the 
“expansion of ethical thought beyond the limits of the human community to include the 
direct moral consideration of the natural world.”14 Callicott expressed the critical 
approach as exploration of “alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced 
upon philosophy by the magnitude and recalcitrance of these problems.”15  
As such, there are many different models and frameworks on either side of the 
aisle from which to choose on how to ascribe/allocate/discover/make value and how to 
calculate/compare/deliberate between competing values and interests. Examples of such 
value models are biocentrism, ecocentrism, and anthropocentrism. And for each value 
model, different frameworks of moral deliberation/calculation (e.g. talk of rights, intrinsic 
and relational value, utilitarianism, and Kantian deontology).16  The champions of each 
argue for their position in the arena of professional academic journals,17 books, and 
conferences, each pressing the other for clarity, validity, and philosophical rigor in order 
to see who is most conceptually coherent and morally stalwart. 
 
                                                 




15 Callicott, “Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics,” 299. 
 
16 Donald Worster, “The Intrinsic Value of Nature,” Environmental Review: ER 4, no. 1 (1980): 43-49. 
 
17 For example: Environmental Ethics, Ethics and the Environment, Environmental Values. 
16 
Non-Anthropocentrism 
Callicott and Worster are examples of those who sit on the side championing what 
is to them the most morally stalwart position: non-anthropocentrism. Callicott defines 
anthropocentrism as a “a value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, [that] 
confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other 
forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e. valuable only to the extent that 
they are means or instruments which may serve human beings.”18 Non-anthropocentrism, 
then, “would confer intrinsic value on some non-human beings.”19  
For Callicott, anthropocentric value theories and forms of moral deliberation 
reduce environmental ethics to an industry of mere utilitarian calculations privileging 
purely economic interests justifying industrialism; a drive that has become self-
destructive, an outworn ideology, that must be abandoned upon facing its consequences 
and calls for the need to adopt “radically different moral values.”20 Since humans are the 
cause of the problem, the human position cannot be trusted to frame and address 
environmental problems and solutions. The goal is to negate, or at least abate, the dangers 
of anthropocentrism that taint moral deliberation with selfish human interest.  
Others who champion non-anthropocentric value theory look towards notions of 
the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places as a “radically different moral value” 
theory to argue for and justify that the moral considerations and rights found in and 
ascribed to humans ought to be expanded to non-human lives and places in order to 
address ever-mounting environmental problems. Given the mostly analytic tradition of 
                                                 




20 ibid; Worster, “The Intrinsic Value of Nature,” 46. 
17 
the field, and the history of the discipline in general, champions of this position must 
grapple with long-standing debates of epistemology, ontology, ethics, and meta-ethics as 
they argue for the moral status of Nature. This means that even within the non-
anthropocentric side of the field there is still debate of how exactly the metaphysical and 
ontological claims extended into moral claims and then how these moral claims can and 
should be put into practice.  
“The Varieties of Intrinsic Value” 
In its most basic form, the claim and argument is that “nature has intrinsic value 
which gives rise to obligations both to preserve it and restore it.”21 It is both a 
metaphysical/ontological claim and a moral claim. The ontological claim is that the 
fundamental structure of reality is made up of objects that have properties that objectively 
justify and validate their continued existence. The moral claim is a consequence of the 
former: if an entity is objectively justified and validated to exist, it necessarily creates an 
obligation for others to protect and perpetuate the existence of said entity. The debate 
within this camp of the field has been the negotiation of the intricate details describing 
how and why it is the case that non-human lives and places have intrinsic value.  
John O’Neill provides a survey of the different ways intrinsic value has been 
defined and argued for.22 He published the article “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value” 
almost 25 years ago. Over the course of the past two decades, the philosophical landscape 
surveyed by O’Neill has been added to by others seeking to defend and critique the ways 
in which the concept is defined and operationalized. Using O’Neill’s survey as an outline, 
                                                 
21 Robert Elliot, “Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness,” The Monist 75, no. 2 (April 
1992): 138. 
 
22 John O’Neill, “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value,” The Monist 75, no. 2 (April 1992): 119-137. 
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I will summarize the concept’s different forms and point to authors who have articulated 
different iterations. Then I will share but a couple of the metaphilosophical and pragmatic 
concerns about the concept’s effectiveness as a basis for environmental ethics on the 
grounds of lack of conceptual coherency and validity through the rejection of its very 
existence in certain forms and calling it “a mistake” to have as the centerpiece of the 
field.23  
To begin, O’Neill identifies at least three different ways the term “intrinsic value” 
is used in the literature, each a stronger ontological claim, and more mysterious 
epistemological claim, than the previous; as moral realism increases, epistemological 
access to it decreases. The hope is that the stronger the ontological claim, the stronger the 
moral obligation. In its weakest form, it is used as a synonym for non-purely instrumental 
value (i.e. against anthropocentric valuations dependent on relation properties)24; in a 
stronger form, it is the value an object has in virtue of “intrinsic properties” (in the 
Moorean sense that the properties of an object makes it the case that it “ought to exist for 
its own sake; [or] is good in itself” independent of its relational properties 25); or its 
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strongest form as a synonym for “objective value” (i.e. value that an object possess due to 
properties beyond analysis which exist independently of any valuations of valuers).26  
O’Neill states that any good environmental ethic must commit to at least the first, 
thus ruling out any form of anthropocentric utilitarianism.27 To be able to hold a 
“defensible ethical position about the environment,” however, one also has to commit to 
one of the two stronger senses of the concept.28 While not very clear about his use of 
“defensible,” I interpret O’Neill to mean “to have moral force in action.” The aim of his 
paper is meant to decide which of the latter two senses are best to do this. This decision 
has to do with, at least according to O’Neill, the different uses of “intrinsic properties” 
within the second and third use of the term and to what extent realist and objectivist 
positions can be held before it turns into hand-waving .29  
In the course of doing this, he notes how many formulations of the argument for 
the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places either fail or are mischaracterized due 
to conflating different senses of terms being used within the same line of reasoning.30 
And in addition to noting the problems with how terms are defined and used in the field, 
O’Neill also reviews other disagreements having to do with how the argument for the 
validity of the concept stands up to historical philosophical debates having to do with the 
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relationship between intrinsic and secondary/extrinsic/ relational properties31 and the 
meta-ethical and epistemological debate between objectivist and subjectivist positions 
(i.e. strong versus weak objectivity). 32   
His summary of the field, and process of deciding between the second and third 
sense of the term, ends with him, interestingly enough, advocating an Aristotelian notion 
of flourishing from within the second sense of the term but also appealing to the strong 
objectivity of the third sense of the term through talk of biological goods and ends: “the 
best human life is one that includes an awareness of and practical concern with the goods 
of entities in the non-human world.”33 Morality demands that humans recognize and 
respect the goods for their own sake for non-human lives and places. He admits that this 
approach might seem “a depressingly familiar one” in that he has “taken a long journey 
into objective value only to arrive back at a narrowly anthropocentric ethic.”34  
It seems that O’Neill concludes that a defensible position must be one that appeals 
to the third sense of the term for the moral force and obligation but has to concede that 
“the most promising general strategy would be to appeal to the claim that a good human 
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life requires a breadth of goods.”35 This “depressingly familiar” kind of conclusion leaves 
many champions of the concept with a bad anthropocentric taste in their mouth, still 
wanting an iteration of the concept and a moral position that does not admit of any 
anthropocentric influence, reasoning, or valuation.  
Reflections on Intrinsic Value 
As the aforementioned overview of the field highlights, the debate is still ongoing 
and actively seeking a strong form of the concept (i.e. a mind-independent intrinsic 
value)  in order to create the desired moral obligation with the appropriate force 
necessary to move minds and bodies to action. Part of the debate is outright rejection any 
argument for this kind of strong intrinsic value (or for any kind of intrinsic value). For 
example, Toby Svoboda states that the position some environmental ethicists have that 
“some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously 
flawed.”36 His reasoning is that humans lack any evidence for this position and are thus 
unjustified in holding it. This highlights the inverse relation between ontological strength 
and epistemic access.  
His schematized argument is as follows: 
1. If humans are justified in holding that some non-human natural entities have 
mind-independent intrinsic value, then humans possess evidence that some non-
human natural entities have mind-independent intrinsic value. 
2. Such evidence must come via a faculty of intuition or via an inference from the 
observable properties of non-human natural entities. 
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3. But this evidence cannot come via intuition, because humans lack such a 
faculty. 
4. Nor can this evidence come via an inference from observable properties, 
because those properties could just as well exist in a world that lacked mind-
independent intrinsic value. 
5. So humans do not possess evidence that some non-human natural entities have 
mind-independent intrinsic value. 
6. Thus humans are not justified in holding that some non-human natural entities 
have mind-independent intrinsic value.37 
 Svoboda does not reject outright all claims of the intrinsic value of non-human 
entities. It is the case, however, that he does not accept claims of mind-independent 
intrinsic value as an observable and intelligible property for humans. As spelled out by 
(2) and (3), for humans to be able to observe and experience such properties would 
require “epistemological access to the ‘independent’ and ‘objective’ world outside human 
experience.”38 O’Neill’s appeal to biological goods and Eugene Hargrove’s appeals to 
“wild naturalness,”39 as proxies to infer an objective intrinsic property or as the objective 
intrinsic property itself, as mind-independent would have to answer to (2) and (3).  If 
Svoboda has accurately spelled out the argument for a strong form of intrinsic value, 
however, it means that the standard by which intrinsic value is to be measured is, almost 
by definition, impossible.  
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The ontological and moral power of a mind-independent and objective property, 
however, is what makes the strongest forms of intrinsic value such an alluring concept. 
Svoboda’s diagnosis hinges on (3): epistemic humility concerning human faculties and 
experience. It would be a fair point to make against Svoboda that his presentation of 
intrinsic value is a bit of a caricature of how it is articulated by its champions, some of 
whom are cautious of how moral realist and objectivist positions are described and 
held.40 That being said, Svoboda’s point that an “objective” insight into the mind-
independent world should not be necessary in order to embody and mobilize 
environmental problem-solving should still hold.41 This highlights a tension between 
theory and practice. It challenges the proponents of the concept to not use intrinsic value 
as a metaphysical crutch or as “a pathetic bauble to brandish like a lucky charm in the 
face”42 of real material and sociopolitical problems.  
Following the Pragmatist tradition, Anthony Weston spells out three reasons why 
the concept of intrinsic value in general cannot play out on the metaphilosophical level. 
First is the demand for self-sufficiency. Weston points out that this definition of an 
intrinsic property depends upon a Cartesian substance ontology; atomistic and discrete 
entities, analyzing objects as they would be if they were in complete isolation from 
everything else in the world. This is a strong commitment to the Western Modern 
paradigm, the very paradigm that has facilitated the current state of environmental and 
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social affairs.43 Moreover, ecologically speaking, no entity can exist in isolation; it makes 
little to no sense to analyze an entity in isolation if it is made in and through a relational 
ecological field.  
Second, and similar to Svoboda’s analysis, intrinsic value must be abstract. 
Intrinsic value, if it is to do the work it is purported to do, must be a special property that 
supersedes all other properties. According to Weston, it leads to a slippery uphill slope to 
a tier of value monism and value reductionism.44 That is, after all, the allure of a strong 
notion of intrinsic value; a single and final value that supersedes all others and 
creates/forces moral obligation and action. To push this further, the third point follows 
what it would take to make sense of this kind of moral imperative: the property demands 
specific justification. Its justification must be grounded in an a priori principle, “God’s 
command” or from “pure reason,” for example. The irony in this move is that it appeals 
to a non-natural property “in order to vindicate the value of nature!”45 Weston says that if 
these three are what is needed to make sense of intrinsic value, environmental ethics 
should want nothing to do with it. After all, it is a field that should be concerned with real 
lives and places on Earth and not focused on some conceptual plane. Weston is not alone 
in his concerns; several other authors from the environmental pragmatist camps voice 
similar metaphilosophical worries regarding the content and structure of intrinsic value.46 
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In a direct response to Svoboda, and to any, like Tom Regan and Weston, who 
suggest that it is a mistake to appeal to the concept and that the field should do away with 
all together, Lars Samuelsson defends intrinsic value, specifically a strong notion of 
mind-independent intrinsic value.47 He agrees with O’Neill that intrinsic value, in some 
way, shape, or form must be appealed to in order to have a proper claim about 
environmental ethics.48 Moreover, Samuelsson holds that those who criticize the concept 
are blind to the “reason-implying” power of intrinsic value. Once we realize that the 
“reason-implying” power of intrinsic value is what does the work, “it also becomes clear 
that it is the concept of a reason, rather than that of intrinsic value, that is most important 
to environmental ethics.”49 This is a new sense of the concept, not discussed by O’Neill. 
Samuelsson reminds us that “environmental ethics is first and foremost a practical 
discipline” and “should be primarily be concerned with” reasons for action, namely to 
take non-human lives and places into moral consideration in order to address pressing 
and urgent environmental problems; reason(s), not values, are what motivate moral 
questions concerning the environment and actions to address them.50 So what reasons 
does the concept afford in order to put theory into practice? 
The Concept in Theory and in Practice 
As we have seen, the in-house disagreements are not just about theoretical 
structure and content. As Svoboda and Samuelsson highlight in different ways, appealing 
to the concept of intrinsic value, even in its strongest forms, still needs to find a way out 
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of the ink and print of journal and book pages. There has been qualitative and quantitative 
work done on how the concept translates into practice in terms of how it influences those 
who commonly visit natural places and those who manage land and natural resources. 
The findings highlight that while participants voice adherence to the concept usually in 
its strongest form to justify their actions and decisions, there is a gap in their practices in 
the face of daily life concerns and limitations marked by limited resources: the economic 
capacity to commit before running out of money, time available to them given their jobs 
to press for changes in natural resource management, etc. 51  
This gap between how the concept is described and how it can be put into practice 
has not been missed by members of the field from any camps of the debate; no one is 
blind to it or in disagreement that it exists. One could say that the field of environmental 
ethics is a project dedicated to bridging this gap, each camp differing in its response as to 
why there is a gap and how to bridge it. As presented above, the non-anthropocentric 
intrinsic value theorists continue to champion their centerpiece as being the best means to 
span the gap between theory and practice. In terms of reasons for action, however, 
Frederick Ferré states that the field and the champions of intrinsic value offer a “rich 
ethical position, but one that lacks internal connections between principles relevant to the 
environment and principles relevant to human society.”52 Even Callicott agrees that “the 
best way to put environmental ethics into practice is to work to instill environmental 
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values in society as the foundation for coercive environmental policies, regulations, and 
laws.”53  
What do the field and the champions of intrinsic value (in its many forms) seem 
to be missing in making it seemingly irrelevant to society? It is not a lack of 
philosophical rigor or analysis; the summary above is the most brief of overviews of an 
expansive and still-growing literature. Lawrence Vogel asked if this gap between theory 
and practice may have something to do with the metaphysical grounding of the field. 
Maybe its theoretical frameworks, valid and sound in the abstract, lack an adequate 
motivational force because of their almost purely theoretical character.54  
Roger J. H. King offers as a diagnosis that this and other kinds of theoretical work 
in the field results in a “disembodied environmental discourse with diminished influence 
on citizens and policy makers.”55 In order to heed King’s warning, I hope to show that 
non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory lacks a critical lens on its own intellectual 
history and the material sociopolitical consequences of basing its arguments on pitting 
human society and nature against each other, their values and interests at odds with one 
another. The next two chapters will complimentarily analyze what keeps this kind of 
environmental ethics from doing what it has set out to do. In fact, what I hope to show is 
that that kind of environmental ethics produced by appeals to and operationalization of 
the concept of intrinsic value is anything but new or a radically different set of moral 
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values; it is actually a method for (re)producing and reinforcing systems for oppression 
and injustice.  
29 
CHAPTER III 
THE ETHICAL TROUBLES WITH INTRINSIC VALUE 
There are troubles with intrinsic value. The trouble is that the field of 
environmental ethics, as Samuelsson states, seeks to fulfill more than just an abstract 
philosophical duty; it is “first and foremost a practical discipline.”56 And while the 
champions of the concept are fully aware that there is a gap between their theorizing and 
practice, they keep doubling down on its centerpiece. We have seen what the arguments 
for the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places are supposed to do (i.e. create 
and/or prove moral obligation to preserve and protect them in the face of human interests) 
and how they are supposed to do so (i.e. appeal to some kind of intrinsic or special 
properties that provide reasons to fulfil said moral obligation). We have also seen the 
disagreement on what intrinsic value is and how it works and wholesale critiques that 
outright reject the concept. These have mostly been from within the field (and mostly 
from the analytic tradition). As the end of the previous chapter foreshadowed, the 
troubles cannot be settled through the same kind of continued and more rigorous 
conceptual analysis.  
The central trouble for the concept is that there is a gap between the claim of 
moral obligation because of the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places and how it 
is supposed to change human minds and practices. I believe that a critical self-awareness 
concerning its intellectual history and a critical self-awareness concerning its material 
consequences in the everyday lives of people can help shed some light on why this gap 
exists for the field. Complementarily, what this chapter and the next will show are the 
ethical and material consequences of the legal embodiment and operationalization of the 
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concept. It (re)produces and reinforces oppressive practices and perpetuates social 
injustice given 1) the concept’s inadequate, and almost non-existent, framework for 
moral deliberation that 2) when used as a basis for problem-framing and problem-solving 
adds to existing, or potentially creates new, environmental and social problems. It 
exacerbates pre-existing problems by ignoring and/or reducing complex assemblages of 
issues to a single set of values and interests which negatively affects the health, lives, and 
livelihoods of people who are most vulnerable to environmental and social problems.  
Before getting there, however, some groundwork must be done to build up to it. 
William Cronon’s and Ramachandra Guha’s analysis of what the concept of Wilderness, 
and the environmentalism built upon it, has done and Val Plumwood’s analysis of 
Modernity’s project of hierarchical categorization will be my foundation for spelling out 
the intellectual history and oppressive logic of intrinsic value that will always keep it 
from doing what its champions want it to do.   
The Troubles with Wilderness 
In 1995 William Cronon wrote about the trouble with Wilderness as a place and 
as a concept in academia and the environmentalist movement.57 He traces the history of 
the concept from early European descriptions of the North American landscape, through 
Thoreau’s proclamation that “in wildness is the preservation of the world,” part of Muir’s 
campaign for the Progressive Era’s national parks into present conservation movements. 
At its core, Wilderness is a concept appealed to and used to refigure the human-nature 
relation by defining what it means to be natural (i.e. Wilderness as untrammeled and 
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untainted places, independent of human influence and destruction) and what kind of 
places humans must visit in order to foster the right kind of relationship with the non-
human world.  
Cronon’s claim is twofold. First, Wilderness is actually a product, a social 
construction, created to advance a very specific American historical narrative and 
reinforce a very specific power relation of who can and cannot appreciate and benefit 
from nature while spelling out the proper ways to experience nature. Second, this 
construct is internally incoherent and, moreover, philosophically, materially, and 
sociopolitically harmful in that “wilderness embodies a dualistic vision in which the 
human is entirely outside the natural.”58 As such, it is not only inadequate in correcting 
the human-nature relationship but also (re)produces a hierarchy of being and power 
where “too many other corners of the earth become less than natural and too many other 
people become less than human, thereby giving us permission not to care much about 
their suffering or their fate.”59  
What I hope to show is that the trouble with intrinsic value is the same kind of 
trouble William Cronon diagnosed concerning Wilderness: not only is it a problematic 
concept in its conceptual structure, but it also reinforces and (re)produces sociopolitical 
power structures that give permission to not care for the suffering or fate of others who 
are a part of the complex problem. Ramachandra Guha anticipated Cronon’s analysis of 
Wilderness by pointing out how environmental ethics and “Radical American 
Environmentalism,” despite its careful conceptual frameworks and claims of universality, 
are “firmly rooted in American environmental and cultural history” where the distinctions 
                                                 
58 Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” 80. 
 
59 Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” 82, 83. 
32 
it debates are of little use when it comes to concerns of “equity and the integration of 
ecological concerns with livelihood and work.”60 Guha focuses on how environmental 
ethics and the American environmentalist narrative culture grounding it is, at best, 
inappropriate for the Third World, and, at worst, actually magnifies environmental and 
social problems when applied in the Third World. I will show in this chapter and the next 
how the concept of intrinsic value, when operationalized in environmental policy and 
action, magnifies the environmental and social problems where applied.  
As Guha puts it, “By making the (largely spurious) anthropocentric-biocentric 
distinction central to the debate, [intrinsic value theorists] may have appropriated the 
moral high ground, but they are at the same time doing a serious disservice to American 
and global environmentalism.”61 What Guha and Cronon in concert yield is a critical 
awareness and realization of the history and consequences of concepts like Wilderness 
and Wildness. I hope to do the same with intrinsic value.  While champions of non-
anthropocentric intrinsic value in environmental ethics think they are doing something 
radically different in terms of environmental and moral philosophy, more refined and 
more rigorous, than mainstream environmentalism, they really are not and cannot with 
the concept.  
A Modern Bequest of a Logic of Oppression 
Beginning in the 16th century, the method by which the Western mind 
investigated, described, and explained the world began to change. Galilean observation, 
Baconian scientific method, Newtonian physics, Leibnizian logic, and Cartesian dualism, 
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are several of the founding concepts of Western Modern thought and are what Western 
culture use to see and make sense of the world. The roots of the concept of intrinsic value 
can be traced through this intellectual history. The basic outline goes as follows: the 
(hu)man is special in the world where the mind of the (hu)man is active in, but separate 
from, the material world; it is a mind whose transcendent consciousness grants an 
exceptional and triumphant status which endows the (hu)man with agential power in a 
mechanistic world; a world full of atomically discrete objects wherein the (hu)man 
actively imposes a will and purpose upon a passive and inert world. In this model and 
framework, humans, and only humans, have intrinsic value. 
The Western Modern scientific paradigm has helped describe the world 
predictably with distinct causes and effects and identifiable concrete explanations. What 
it also has done, however, is monopolize the ways and means of knowing and making 
sense of the world. The Western Modern scientific paradigm became the way of knowing 
that for the past five centuries has dictated how people, places, and power are to be 
organized. This organizing is usually done by and in favor of a specific group at the 
expense of others by defining the categories and the hierarchy of the great chain of being 
with those who have been found to have intrinsic value at the top. Because if you control 
epistemological access to Nature and have the power to decide what the ontological 
constitution of it is, you also control the explanations and reasons for which bodies 
belong where, which bodies do what, and why those bodies (have) do it (i.e. you define 
the human and non-human, race, gender, sex, class, physicality, and everything else those 
entail).  
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Val Plumwood spells out both the intellectual framework and the process through 
which categories were created and perpetuated to justify and reinforce the oppression of 
‘other’ bodies and places who/that did not, and still do not, fall into the narrative shared 
above, specifically women and people of color.62 The core philosophical tenet of the 
Western Modern scientific paradigm can be traced to the Cartesian system of dualistic 
category analysis. Plumwood spells out the philosophical structure of dualisms as a 
“relationship of denied dependency [that] determines a certain kind of logical structure, 
in which the denial and the relation of domination/subordination shape the identity of 
both relata.”63 At the heart of this system is the human/nature distinction with all the 
other binaries predicated from the oppositional definitions at play between the 
foundational two definitions. The key to the power of the dualistic system is not just that 
it creates and oppositionally defines concepts, terms, people, and places. As Plumwood 
asserts, concepts, terms, people, and places are defined hierarchically, constructing an 
imbalanced power relation that favors a preselected/predefined few over others.64 
What does all this have to do, however, with intrinsic value? As spelled out 
earlier, environmental ethics is attempting to correct a human-nature relation grounded in 
a binary system that separates the human and non-human world in order for the latter to 
be used instrumentally in favor of the former. Claims of the intrinsic value of non-human 
lives and places, in its many forms and iterations, are attempts at either granting equal 
moral standing to non-human lives, places, and interests so that they have equal moral 
consideration in moral deliberation or – with the stronger forms of intrinsic value, grant 
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greater moral standing to non-human lives, places, and interests than to human lives, 
places, and interests – in order to correct an imbalanced human-nature relation. The 
stronger form of the concept inverts the power relation the Western Modern scientific 
paradigm is built upon. As Weston’s second critique points out in the previous chapter, 
this, at its base, is the allure of a strong sense of intrinsic value in environmental ethics 
(i.e. a single and final value that supersedes all others and creates/forces moral obligation 
and action).65  
In correcting the relation in this manner, however, intrinsic value advocates are 
attempting to correct from within the binary system of defining and arranging lives, 
people, places, and power on a hierarchical gradient of importance. Plumwood warns that 
“escape from dualised relationships and dualised identity represents a particularly 
difficult problem, involving a sort of logical maze” difficulty to escape from with the 
tools of the binary system.66 As such, it falls back into a logic that favors a specific 
predefined and predetermined interest above all else at great expense to others. Intrinsic 
value theory’s very logical structure, then, bars it from being able to have a critical and 
nuanced perspective on a complex environmental problem. It remains trapped with the 
Western Modern system of hierarchically organized lives, places, and powers.  
Harmful Moral Deliberation 
The kind of moral deliberation this produces for environmental ethics is not new 
or radical. It is, at best, lazy. It is, of course, the case that many do not grant non-human 
lives, places, and interests moral standing. Simply shifting the power relation between 
humans and non-humans by lifting the latter up to a privileged standing only humans 
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once had, however, would make deliberation nothing more than a has-it-or-not system of 
moral deliberation. In terms of deliberation when it comes to making a decision about a 
pressing and urgent problem, to say everything has intrinsic value is equivalent to saying 
that nothing has intrinsic value. It would not actually help work through complex socio-
environmental problems given the still absent hand-of-reason or hand-of-god pointing 
one direction over the other as Weston points out in his third critique.67  
This distinguishing property is what the strong forms of intrinsic value offer. This, 
however, simply inverts the power relation by granting greater value to the non-human 
factors, but does nothing to change the logic. This kind of power inversion happens 
according to a predetermined and fixed idea of what it means to address environmental 
problems that continues to favor a select few lives and environments at the expense of 
many other lives and environments. As Cronon and Guha have described, this method of 
addressing problems reaffirms the imbalanced power relation between those advocating 
for this kind of ethic and those who have to live their daily lives from within the midst of 
socio-environmental problems.  
As highlighted by Plumwood, the very structure and logic of the dualistic system 
is a feedback loop perpetually (re)creating and (re)affirming hierarchical ontological and 
epistemological positions that have always already been predetermined by a group with 
intentions of pushing specific ends given their position and often privileged perspective. 
It is a maze in which the logic of oppression is constantly (re)created. My application of 
Plumwood’s work to intrinsic value is to say that the concept, in any of its forms, will 
end up in this maze, attempting to escape from within with the tools of the binary system. 
When it comes to the logical maze this model and framework (re)creates, Plumwood 
                                                 
67 Weston, “Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics,” 290. 
37 
suggest a rather simple but difficult way out: leave the model and framework behind. As 
Bryan Norton puts it, “as we recognize that these limits are very real and raise moral 
questions that we have never asked before, we will realize how inadequate are the 
frameworks of terms and concepts bequeathed us by modernism.”68 The argument for the 
intrinsic value of non-human lives and places is a bequest from limiting Modern ways of 
thinking.  
Even in the face of these kinds of problems, the concept is still put to work. In 
order to span the gap between theory and practice, however, the concept alone is not 
enough. It needs a vehicle through which to operationalize and materialize the work it is 
supposed to do, that is, create reasons to change minds and practices. Its weaker forms 
are not enough for the most ardent champions of the concept, philosophers and activists. 
The weaker forms that allow for subjectivism, relational value, and extrinsic dependence, 
in their eyes, turn into utilitarianism with no moral teeth or force to counteract 
anthropocentric values. The strongest form of intrinsic value – non-anthropocentric in its 
objectivist positions on mind-independent intrinsic properties – is seen as the way to 
correct environmental problems. The next chapter will investigate a concrete example of 
both a vehicle for this strongest form of intrinsic value and of how it (re)produces and 
reinforces social and environmental problems.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DELTA SMELT, WATER, AND INJUSTICE 
A Clash of Ethics and Justice 
 The previous chapter set the conceptual groundwork needed to demonstrate how 
the use of intrinsic value as a basis for environmental ethics and environmental problem-
solving fails when put into practice. It is a lazy framework for moral deliberation that 
reduces problem-framing down to a single prechosen value as the goal. It ignores how 
complex and interrelated social and environmental problems are. And when used as a 
basis for instilling non-anthropocentric environmental values via environmental 
protection laws and policies, intrinsic value theory actively (re)produces and reinforces a 
history, intellectual and material, of oppressive practices of social inequities and harm.  
This chapter works in tandem with the previous chapter by presenting a concrete 
example of how this happens through policy and practice. It is an examination of how the 
United States Federal Endangered Species Act69 and the state of California Endangered 
Species Act70 are applied to the biological and ecological status of the Delta Smelt and its 
habitat in the Sacramento-San Joaquin estuary (known as the Delta). The investigation 
will begin by spelling out how the legislation in legal practice is a vehicle for a strong 
form of the argument for the intrinsic value of non-human lives and places. The rest of 
the chapter will describe how the law plays a part in ignoring and making worse existing 
social and political tensions. 
Granted, the champions of intrinsic value in its many forms – from its weakest 
iterations admitting to subjectivism, relational value, and extrinsic dependence to the 
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strongest claims stating that it is a completely objective and mind-independent property – 
have their opinions and reservations on how the concept is put to practice in law and 
policy. It would be their responsibility, however, to describe ways to best “instill 
environmental values in society as the foundation for coercive environmental policies, 
regulations, and laws” that do not do ignore and making worse existing social and 
political inequities that disproportionately affect the most socially, politically, and 
environmental vulnerable.71 At least one thing is certain when using the intrinsic value 
theory as a foundation for environmental problem-solving through policies, regulations, 
and laws: these kinds of environmental values – preserving and protecting Wildness, 
Wilderness, and the strong intrinsic value of Nature – are certainly coercive. Lacking a 
critical self-awareness concerning its intellectual history and heritage and a critical self-
awareness concerning its material consequences in the everyday lives of people and 
places have led the contemporary environmental movements and the professional 
academic field to be blind to which groups of people and communities are being most 
coerced.  
The Concept at Work 
The Endangered Species Act 
Modeled after the California Endangered Species Act passed into law in 1970, the 
United States Endangered Species Act passed into law in 1973 because Congress found 
that “various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered 
extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate 
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concern and conservation.”72 The laws are meant “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species 
and threatened species.”73 For the past 40 years it has been one of the strongest laws in 
the United States and California appealed to and used to protect, conserve, and 
rehabilitate species and their habitats; it gives legal teeth to environmental concerns and 
values.  
The environmental concerns stem from Congress finding that “species of fish, 
wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or 
threatened with extinction.”74 Their extinction would be a loss because of the “esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its 
people.”75  Not listed among these values are concerns for sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic impacts on non-industrial interests and stakeholders. The human interest 
is described monolithically lumping together all interests as being the same, namely 
“untempered" economic growth and development which is seen to be equally beneficial 
for all humans.  
Moreover, while the US ESA and the CA ESA state several values that these 
endangered species have, when considered in court, judges usually state in their rulings 
that “Congress intended to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction—
whatever the cost [emphasis mine]. This kind of language reveals a conscious design to 
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the legislation to give endangered species priority over the ‘primary missions’ of federal 
agencies.”76 Most, if not all, federal and state agencies who manage land have primary 
missions of multiple-use and/or wise-use citing esthetic, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value among the values of the land.77 The aforementioned 
court ruling, however, states that the primary mission of the ESA is to favor species 
preservation above all else at whatever the cost. 
Environmental activist groups who appeal to the ESA in the courts frame their 
argument in defense of species and their habitats as that a certain species or habitat has 
moral value and legal rights to exist independent of how humans interact with non-human 
lives and places. Given this legal history, in practice through legal precedent the ESA 
embodies the strongest form of the concept of intrinsic value of non-human lives and 
places – their value is independent and above all other concerns and interests. In doing 
so, it is often the case that in its attempts to correct and rectify the human-nature relation 
in order to address environmental problems, intrinsic value, through the vehicle of the 
ESA, draws sharp ontological, moral, legal, and sociopolitical lines between the lives and 
places in question. This inversion of the power dynamic in the human-nature relation is 
supposed to correct a radically out-of-balance history of purely anthropocentric utilitarian 
use of natural resources. Doing it in this way, however, is a dangerous overcorrection.  
It is an overcorrection that begins to do more harm than good when it goes into 
deliberation with a notion that any human interest or concern will taint the process. This 
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leads to the exclusion of any other human voice that is not advocating the protection of 
the species and its habitat at any cost. And when a group is left unheard, or forced to be 
unheard, in order to deliver on the promise of single-minded environmental protection, it 
exacerbates existing, and may create new, socio-environmental problems by reducing a 
complex situation to a single factor. And expecting a single factor to address a larger 
complex situation composed of an interconnected and interrelated web of issues leads to 
paralysis, hostility, and a failure to communicate experiences and perspectives in order to 
address the many issues affecting so many lives and places. Let us look into how this 
happens when a problem reaching back a hundred years and affecting millions of lives is 
put on the shoulders of a fish the size of your thumb. 
Delta Smelt, Water, and the Central Valley; “Water Politics by another Name” 
The California Delta Smelt was designated threatened and registered as such in 
accordance with the US ESA in the spring of 1993.78 The following year it was 
determined to have a critical habitat under the US ESA and in 2010 the State of 
California listed it a critically endangered species under its ESA.79 Each new designation 
adds political and material priority to protecting the Delta Smelt and their habitat. For 
over the past 20 years the federal Fish and Wildlife Service, the California Fish and 
Game Department, the California Central Valley farmers, and California Central Valley 
farmworkers and inhabitants have been in a tug of war, the State Water Resources 
Control Board being the rope. Driving through California on Interstate 5 and CA 
Highway 99 you see signs saying “Food grows where water flows,” “Stop the Congress 
created Dustbowl,” “No Water = No Jobs,” and other signs naming the state and 
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congressional representatives who should by blamed for the problem.  Peter Alagona and 
the press tell the story as having three characters.  There are the federal and state agencies 
who, by law, seek to protect and conserve the Delta Smelt, a native indicator species to 
the Sacramento and San Joaquin estuary delta by keeping millions and millions of gallons 
of Sierra Nevada snow melt from being pumped down south to Central Valley farmers 
and farmworkers who lose fields, profits, jobs, and food because of it. There are the 
farmers and farmworkers who see the withholding of water as a matter of human health, 
lives, and livelihoods being sacrificed for the sake of a tiny fish with no commercial 
benefit. And there are the environmental activists who see the Delta Smelt and its 
environment as a species and a habitat that is critically endangered because of the 
aforementioned lives and livelihoods.80 
According to Alagona, the real matter at hand in the debate is the long-standing 
politics of how water is allocated in relation to how people are distributed throughout the 
state. Prior to the court rulings enforcing the ESA, about 70% of the water that flows 
through the Sacramento-San Joaquin river Delta is pumped south to and through the 
California Central Valley and as far south as Los Angeles serving almost thirty million 
people and five million acres of irrigated farmland.81 Several water projects have 
distributed delta water to different parts of the state for agricultural, commercial, and 
residential use at the satisfaction and dissent of different regional interests. The dissent 
usually comes from the part of the state that will not benefit from the water conveyance 
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from a specific project. This usually leads to sectionalist debates between the northern 
part of the state where the delta is and the more arid yet more densely populated southern 
part of the state.  
In addition to this, the delta itself has a century-long history of being misused and 
polluted through short-sighted agricultural, industrial, and commercial practices. 
California also has an archaic and arcane system of water rights law making any and 
every reallocation of water in the state a tooth-and-nail legal battle. Compounding both of 
these is the increasing occurrence and degrees of drought and alarmingly patterned 
decreasing levels of snowpack in the Sierra Nevada. All contributing factors to the poor 
conditions of the delta where the smelt live, less availability of fresh water, and increased 
sociopolitical tensions about who has rights to the ever lessening amounts of water and 
who holds responsibility for addressing the entangled web of issues.82 
The situation is already complex and complicated with outdated and ill-equipped 
water rights law, unsustainable agricultural practices, politically complex food subsidies 
that influence and affect said agricultural practices, sectionalist politics pitting regions of 
the state against each other, and increasing occurrence and severity of drought and 
decreasing snowpack. It is a situation that “reveals the challenges of environmental 
governance in a complicated federalist system where no single individual or organization 
possesses a majority of the political power.”83 All these issues have been shaping water 
and regional politics for a very long time and are in dire need of being addressed in 
themselves. The Delta Smelt issue, Alagona says, “provides an example of how, under 
the ESA, even uncharismatic species now shape debates about land use and natural 
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resource management.”84 But it is not only that the Delta Smelt and the ESA have shaped 
the debate; it has reframed the debate putting the entire weight of and blame for the 
complex amalgam of factors and problems on a fish at the brink of its existence as if its 
existence is the cause of the problems facing the Delta and California.  
This should be enough to highlight how intrinsic value, when used as a foundation 
for moral deliberation when it comes to environmental problems, reveals itself to be lazy 
in that it simply reduces a complex situation to a single interest that does not and cannot 
address the multiple causes and influences that have led to the problematic situation. 
When a strong form of intrinsic value of the Delta Smelt is operationalized via the legal 
rights granted to it through the ESA, it ignores the context. This is how intrinsic value is 
an ineffective foundation for environmental problem-framing and problem-solving.  
To demonstrate the second part of my claim against the use of intrinsic value in 
environmental ethics – that it (re)produces and exacerbates preexisting social inequities 
and inequality – we must look at how the people who live and work in the Central Valley 
are negatively affected by the application of the concept via legal means. We have to look 
into what happens when intrinsic value and the environmental ethicists and 
environmental activists who champion it forget to think about how not all humans are 
equally responsible for environmental problems.   
Injustice by another Name 
The Central Valley of California is a vast swath of farmland in what is/should be 
a desert. For those who have had no other means of work, food, or water if not for the 
farmland created through the supply of northern water and the efforts of Bureau of 
Reclamation, however, the Central Valley has been the only home they have known or 
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have been able to know. The Central Valley is a patchwork of rich and diverse 
communities representing changes in the agricultural and immigration history of the state. 
It traces the history of East Asian immigrants in the early 20th century because they were 
barred from almost all other work and places, Dust Bowl refugees from the Midwest in 
the 1930’s, Mexican Braceros during World War II to bolster the United States’ 
agricultural labor force, and the continued influx of immigrants from Latin-America over 
the past thirty years.85 More to the point, most of these communities are populations that 
have been historically discriminated against, politically underrepresented, and socially 
underserviced. Those who make a life in the Central Valley are not unused to difficult 
times prompted by a plethora of socioeconomic problems. The availability of only 
temporary and seasonal jobs, a saturated labor market, low wages, poor schools, 
environmental health hazards, and substandard housing are amongst the worst in the 
state. And many of these problems follow the barometer of state agricultural and water 
policy.86 
The court rulings in favor of the ESA and the Delta Smelt make all these 
preexisting sociopolitical and environmental health problems worse. By prioritizing the 
interests of the Delta Smelt above all other factors, the already limited natural and social 
resources of these communities are lessened, the weight of an already over-stressed and 
unaddressed complex system is passed down onto the groups and communities who 
already carry much of the social and environmental burden. Ever less available clean 
drinking water, fewer employment prospects, higher food prices, increased sociopolitical 
discrimination due to ethnic and migration exacerbated by economic and political 
                                                 




tensions are just some of the increased hardships the communities of the Central Valley 
have had to face in recent decades. In order to voice the concerns and interests of those 
who live and work in the Central Valley, many community groups and non-profits have 
banded together to speak collectively and lobby at the state and congressional level. 
Groups such as the Central California Environmental Justice Network and the 
Environmental Justice Coalition for Water work to highlight and fight against the 
continued underrepresentation and social hardships these communities face because of 
their history and how environmental protection laws are not only blind to the history but 
help perpetuate it.87 
If Environmental Ethics is without Justice… 
The Delta Smelt problem is framed by some as a matter of pushing it to the brink 
of extinction because of not respecting the intrinsic moral value of the species. The ESA 
as a legal and political vehicle for its value is supposed to fix this problem. Fixing this 
problem in this way, however, has caused, and will continue to cause, social, political, 
and economic distress. What has been shown is that the concept, when operationalized in 
this way, does not and cannot address the problem for it incorrectly frames the problem 
due to its method of reducing to a single value of interest and, in doing so, perpetuates 
existing problems. Let it be clear, I am not saying that the Delta Smelt should be allowed 
to go extinct. Nor am I calling for a complete dissolution of environmental protection 
laws and regulations. What is needed, however, in light of the conceptual and material 
shortcomings of the concept in theory and in practice, is a closer and critical examination 
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of how environmental problems are being framed and to what end their solutions are 
being pursued.  
To speak concretely, addressing this problem is not just a matter of turning off the 
pumps and maintaining an ecologically adequate supply of water for a biologically 
adequate population of Smelt in order for it to not go extinct. It would take a framework 
that recognizes the complex interconnection of problems having to do with a myriad of 
interconnected issues. In this case, it would have to grapple with the confluence of 
century-old water rights law; agricultural policy at the state and national level that deals 
with farm subsidies and influences food prices; immigration, labor, and public health 
policy that address the concerns and conditions of the people living in the Central Valley 
communities; industrial and commercial water use regulations throughout the state; and 
regional disputes concerning political clout and power.  
As the ESA has been interpreted and enforced, it has become quite the legal and 
political vehicle for the strongest sense of intrinsic value. What has not come with it, 
however, is the moral and ethical work it is supposed to do. As operationalized by the 
ESA, it exacerbates and amplifies long-standing socio-environmental problems. I cannot 
go through every instance of where, when, and how the ESA has put the strong sense of 
intrinsic value to work and how it has failed in the ways I have been describing. I am 
willing to wager, however, that most follow suit in harmfully reducing down to a single 
value and interest which ignores how environmental problems do not and cannot exist 
outside of constitutive and causal entanglements of complex social, economic, and 
political problems.  
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By ignoring existing sociopolitical problems in its problem-solving efforts, the 
concept at work (re)produces them. In addition to this, because it ignores the existing 
sociopolitical problems that are simultaneously creating and created by environmental 
problems, it also does not actually address the environmental problem. In the case of the 
Delta Smelt, keeping more water in the Delta will not save the Smelt if the agricultural 
practices and its chemical pollutants in the Delta are not addressed as well. And 
addressing the harmful agricultural and chemical practices in Delta involves engaging 
with the social and political plight of the communities who have to suffer from them the 
most. 
As mentioned, the philosophical champions of intrinsic value are sure to have 
their qualms with the ESA and how it puts the concept to work. Given what has been 
spelled out about the philosophical and material faults with the concept, however, how 
else can the concept be put to practical work to do the environmental problem-solving 
and the social mind and practice changing it is purported to do? Ideally, the concept, as 
Weston noted, would work by imposing an a priori principle of “God’s command” to 
stop or as an interdiction from “pure reason” that, upon confronting them with the 
concept, would lead all those who are culprits of environmental degradation and harm to 
stop their actions and practices and change their mental and moral groundwork in order to 
further respect the intrinsic and moral value of non-human lives and places.88 That, 
however, in any form of the concept, has yet to happen. 
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As Tom Regan argues, it is a mistake to think that the concept of intrinsic value of 
non-human lives and places can do the work it is purported to do.89 And it has been a 
mistake privileged with 40 years of attention afforded a lot of ink and paper without 
much real progress. So shy of having the power to rectify the complex situation by being 
able to reset the clock back to time zero and allow the situation to play out again anew 
with the benefit of hindsight, a better method of investigating and framing environmental 
problems is necessary if the field wants to avoid these kinds of consequences. What is 
needed is a model that is better equipped to grapple with a complex web of 
interconnected lives and interests from within the problems.  
While a select few, be they the kind of activist or academic described, have had 
the privilege of being able to visit and enjoy the kind of Wilderness and Wildness so 
praised and ride a conceptual merry-go-round that is often ontologically, epistemically, 
and experientially divorced from the material reality of environmental degradation and 
harm, there are those who have to live in and through the dangers and effects of 
environmental degradation. And it is to those situations, lives, people, and places we 
should turn to for a better understanding of environmental problems. Environmental 
ethics should look towards environmental pragmatism and how it navigates cases of 
environmental injustice in order to span the gap between theory and practice and 
accomplish its mission of addressing pressing and urgent environmental problems.  
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CHAPTER V 
TRANSCORPOREALITY AS DEMOCRATIC NATURALISM  
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
On the formal and professional philosophical level, my arguments have been 
against a non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory as a flagship argument in 
environmental ethics and as a foundation for environmental problem-solving. I have 
pointed out how the concept, specifically in its stronger forms, fails conceptually and 
materially in addressing environmental and social problems in that it, at best, is a lazy 
form of moral deliberation unable to grapple with complexity and, at worst, is a method 
for perpetuating oppressive and discriminatory social practices because it ignores or 
reduces the complexity of the problem. If my concerns and critiques are valid, 
environmental ethics is in need of a new direction.  
This makes me responsible for suggesting an alternative that is better able to 
grapple with a complex web of interrelated non-human and human lives and interests. I 
hope to redirect the field towards socio-environmental problem-solving by addressing 
social injustice by focusing its energy and efforts on cases of environmental injustice. I 
believe that the work being done by Environmental Pragmatism is better able to grapple 
with complex environmental problems by not appealing to and favoring a single 
predetermined value outside the context of the situation. I also believe, however, that 
Environmental Pragmatism could use some help with how to better grapple with harmful 
power relations and complex sociopolitical situations in order to foster an effective 
environmental ethic.  
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This chapter seeks to accomplish three things. First, since the target audience of 
my critiques has been the champions of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, I will 
argue for how classical Pragmatism, specifically John Dewey’s naturalism, can help 
temper the concerns of dangerous anthropocentrism when environmental ethics is done 
without appeal to strong intrinsic value. Second, in order to make sure that social justice 
is an explicit dimension in the framing and deliberation in environmental problem-
solving, I will highlight Ben Minteer’s work in refounding environmental ethics with 
concerns for democracy and the public interest as a centerpiece.   
Lastly, to bolster Dewey’s naturalism and reinforce Minteer’s reframing, I will 
introduce the field to Stacy Alaimo’s use of trans-corporeality as a way of materially 
investigating the relation between environments and bodies that recognizes the power 
relations built into environmental degradation. This merger of Dewey’s naturalism made 
sharper by Minteer’s concern for environmental Democracy and the public interest and 
materialized by Alaimo’s description of how trans-corporeality frames the project of 
environmental justice is what I call “democratic naturalism.” 
Environmental Pragmatism and Anthropocentric Concerns 
Critical approaches to environmental ethics have been championed by 
environmental pragmatists who seek to bring to bear the ontological models and moral 
frameworks of the classical American Pragmatists on the metaphilosophical, ontological, 
and moral shortcomings of the conventional approaches. Some go even as so far as to 
claim that pragmatism has always already been an environmental ethic by taking into 
account environmental factors in diagnosing moral and social conflict.90 Most prevalent 
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in the environmental pragmatism is the work of John Dewey. Two main components of 
his philosophy are imported in order to do environmental ethics:  his naturalism to 
reorganize the relationship between humans and non-human nature (i.e. a relational 
ontological model compared to the substance/static model with intrinsic value) and his 
theory of inquiry and valuation to navigate multifaceted and contentious environmental 
situations (i.e. value pluralism).  
The latter would provide a framework for problem analysis and framing that 
intrinsic value does not have. This problem-framing failure and its conceptual and 
sociopolitical consequences  have already been spelled out by Weston in Chapter II, 
rearticulated in Chapter III, and as exemplified by the application of the ESA for the 
Delta Smelt and the California Central Valley case in the previous chapter. The former 
would help address the issues of ontological distinction highlighted by Cronon and how 
these ontological and moral distinctions lead to inappropriate moral frameworks as 
highlighted by Guha. Or as King put it, it is a “disembodied environmental discourse with 
diminished influence on citizens and policy makers.”91 
There are concerns, however, that having as the focus the social and political 
conditions of environmental issues in addressing environmental problems shirks the 
philosophical duty of addressing “discipline-defining questions” such as “answering 
foundational questions, questions such as ‘what sorts of entities are owed moral 
consideration?’”92 The conventional approach demands that that causal order of 
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investigation proceed from answering the theoretical question in order to address the 
material conditions (and in this way avoid (dangerous) anthropocentrism).  
This is reminiscent of the Rawlsian method of knowing the content and structure 
of ideal theory before addressing the pressing and urgent non-ideal matters. How can we 
get the ideas right, however, before knowing what the problems are? As has been argued, 
the field of environmental ethics and mainstream environmental activism has framed the 
environmental problem as an issue with the human-nature relation, namely that there is a 
lack of recognition and respect for the special and intrinsic properties of Nature (mainly 
found in and through its Wilderness and Wildness). The structure and content of the field 
and the activist narrative has been about correcting the imbalance between the ontological 
differences between humans and nature. To convince those who are suspicious of not 
having a clear distinction between human and non-human interests, what has to be argued 
is how Dewey’s naturalism, in reorganizing the relationship between humans and non-
human nature, is not just another way of championing a purely anthropocentric and 
instrumentalist relationship with the non-human elements of environments. 
Dewey’s Naturalism 
Dewey’s pragmatism makes no such sharp ontological distinction between 
humans and the more-than-human world. Dewey’s naturalism spells out why this kind of 
distinction is unnecessary and is actually part of the problem as echoed by Cronon, Guha, 
and King. Larry Hickman and Hugh McDonald have already spoken to how Dewey’s 
naturalism is not just a disguised form of anthropocentrism (by uncritically merging 
together the human and non-human) and how it is in fact a better ontological model for 
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proceeding with environmental ethics. 93 While Hickman and McDonald differ in certain 
aspects of their interpretation, both defend it against accusations of dangerous 
anthropocentrism. In fact, they suggest that Dewey’s naturalism trumps the conventional 
method, for it does not appeal to a constrictive and limiting idealized, independent, and 
objective realm of non-human nature while also not being a bottomless pit of purely 
subjective values that can offer no foundation for moral deliberation.  
Dewey is famous for speaking about organisms in their environments. Inquiry, in 
its most basic form, is an organism (re)negotiating its life in and with its environment for 
a better end; what he calls growth.94 Dewey’s description of what it is for an organism to 
be in and with its environment has prompted worries on both ends of the philosophical 
spectrum. George Santayana would accuse Dewey’s naturalism of being “half-hearted” 
or “short-winded” and “ignoring, or worse, idealizing, non-human nature.”95 At the other 
end, Dewey has been accused of instrumentalism akin to that of the 17th century natural 
philosophers; reductionist to the point of mechanism.96 It seems that he describes too 
little or too much depending on what the interpreters seek to champion.  
To interpret Dewey’s naturalism and what he calls instrumentalism as either an 
idealization or a mere reduction is a gross misunderstanding of Dewey’s philosophy 
according to Hickman. “Nature” is a construct, “a complex of objects of knowledge”; it is 
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a cultural artifact, ever-changing, never finished, but “not constructed out of nothing.”97 
Dewey’s naturalism aims to collapse the sharp Cartesian distinction between mind and 
body, human and nature.98 For Dewey, mind, read as human experience, “is found in 
connection with some organized body. Every such body exists in a natural medium to 
which it sustains some adaptive connection”99; “the human situation falls wholly within 
nature.”100 If we are to read experience as such, experience is not a privileged and purely 
subjective position of humans defined as concepts and propositions having only to do 
with truth claims about discrete objects in the world. Experience is but a basic and 
ubiquitous activity by all organisms in their material environments as they navigate and 
negotiate relations; “experience is of as well as in nature.”101 Values, then, are not just in 
the mind a priori or ad hoc nor are they transcendent and universal waiting to be 
appealed to. Values are in and of the (natural) world, dependent on the situation as 
experienced in and through an environment, not independent or predetermined by a pre-
existing, non-natural moral property. 
Given the always already entangled character and quality of human experience 
and the constantly changing environments in which organisms live out their lives, 
Dewey’s naturalism describing how human experience is an extension of the ever on-
going (re)negotiation between an environment and its elements cannot be the kind of 
dangerous anthropocentric utilitarianism that so many fear. That kind of 
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anthropocentrism only makes sense in an ontology that makes a sharp distinction between 
human interests and environmental interests; a sharp human-nature antagonism as 
described by mainstream and radical environmentalism and how many of the intrinsic 
value arguments are framed. 
If done properly, and by that I mean if done with critical self-awareness of history 
and context, inquiry into environmental problems with a basis in this kind of naturalism 
is not and cannot be anthropocentric, for it demands an investigation of the entire 
relational field that creates the problematic situation; human and non-human experience 
are intertwined and experience growth and regression together. And as with any domain 
of inquiry for Dewey, in order to inquire correctly “tools must be continuously revised if 
they are to be appropriate to new tasks. Tasks must be likewise continuously re-evaluated 
in the light of the tools available for their execution.”102 The tools needed to address the 
situation should stem from in the midst of the situation and not be predetermined outside 
the situation in an abstract way, something intrinsic value theory does.  
What this kind of ontological and epistemic model does is reveal the deep and 
rich ever-existing connection between humans and their environments. As has been 
alluded to throughout this argument, environmental problems and social problems are 
causes and results of each other, ever (re)negotiating the relationship between how the 
environment responds to how (sections of) human society (inter)act with their 
environments. Environmental problems are socio-environmental problems that cannot be 
disentangled from each other. And attempts to do so, as with intrinsic value theory, blinds 
one to the histories of how the power relations within human society have caused many 
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lives – human and non-human alike – and environments to be more harmfully affected 
than others.  
Approaches to environmental ethics like intrinsic value theory, in its attempts to 
discover or create a neutral narrative that will correct the human-environment relation by 
pointing to the special and superior properties of Nature, silence the stories of the 
communities and environments who have had to bear the burdens of sociopolitical 
constructions and environmental harms. What Dewey’s naturalism points out, and what 
Ben Minteer highlights, is how not all humans experience the same advantages of 
disrespecting and polluting Nature; not all members of the public reap the benefits of the 
instrumental human industry of Nature.  
Environmental Democracy and the Public Interest 
Ben Minteer has highlighted how the issues of unfulfilled democracy and social 
inequalities are either left unsaid or are soft-spoken in only being pointed at as something 
that happens in the field of environmental ethics at large and also within the 
environmental pragmatist camp. He finds the “highly ideological and potentially 
undemocratic character of the strong version of the nonanthropocentric program” 
distressing in the potential and active practice of sacrificing local concerns in different 
specific environments and communities in the name of saving “the environment” at large 
and in general by closing off collective inquiry and discussion before it can even 
begin.103  
Much of what it would mean to be socially and environmentally just rests on there 
being a democratically sensitive and open inquiry into the causes, both ecological and 
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political, of problems, the values and interests at play in the situation, and the potential 
avenues to address socio-environmental problems through these causes, values, and 
interests. Closing off collective inquiry, however, is the result of suspicions, harbored by 
some in the non-anthropocentric program, concerning democratic approaches to 
environmental problem-solving. The tension concerning democratic values in 
environmental ethics, however, or at least according to the conventional environmental 
ethicists as championed by Callicott, is that they tend to be “cryptic,” “insidious,” and 
ironically undemocratic for non-human participants.104  
Democracy, in any form, is difficult to foster and maintain. That should not be an 
argument, however, for why it fails or is an impediment to addressing environmental 
problems. Minteer contests that Callicott wants some sort of “prepolitical claim regarding 
the essence of human nature, or perhaps the existence of certain natural rights” upon 
which to ground claims of democratic values, neither of which are philosophically 
tenable (or at least in the way Callicott and other non-anthropocentrists would want 
them/accept them).105  
Minteer defends Dewey’s concept of democracy against debate within the 
pragmatist camp of whether or not it is robust enough to be more than an ungrounded 
“social hope” or a “fuzzy” utopian vision.106 He does this by fleshing out in detail how a 
retooled notion of the “public interest.” At the center of environmental ethics should be a 
citizenry informed and critical of how problems are connected and framed. Listening to 
the “public interest” requires an open democratic inquiry with the end-in-view of 
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changing the material conditions of lives and environments.107 Minteer boldly states that 
the field of environmental ethics, or at least the non-anthropocentrist camp, has pitted 
itself against the “public interest” because it has framed “the public” as having a unified 
pan-human interest defined as being distinctly against the interests of Nature.108 In this 
light, “the public and its problems” are always and only anthropocentric and, as such, 
cannot be trusted to properly address environmental problems. What of “the public and 
its environmental problems”?109  
Minteer reintroduces environmental ethics to the human dimension of 
environmental problem-solving via democracy and the social justice interests and 
concerns certain communities have. He suggests that had environmental ethics had a 
more nuanced and critical notion of different populations of the public and had they paid 
serious attention to the environmental problems of the marginalized public’s interest and 
concern through Dewey’s conception of democracy and theory of inquiry, “it doubtless 
would have been (and would be now) much more engaged with influential movements in 
citizen environmental action, not to mention a range of discussions in such areas as risk 
communication, pollution prevention  and regulatory reform, public understanding of 
science, and so on.”110 I argue that this nuanced notion of the “public interest” is key to 
avoiding a method that lacks value and method pluralism and that is only comfortable, 
willing, and able to proceed in a single-minded fashion as the only way to correct 
environmental problems.  
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Minteer describes a framework that takes as its starting point the concerns of 
different groups with different social positionalities and using those values and concerns 
to motivate the inquiry into the situation. In not being preoccupied with accomplishing a 
preset goal via a preset path, it allows for the acknowledgment that not all humans have 
the same environmental interests (as the non-anthropocentrist program seems to assume 
in the manner they set up their arguments pitting human values against Nature). And 
while this is no guarantee that oppressive hierarchies will be immediately dismantled, it 
at least recognizes them as part of the complex socio-environmental problem that also 
needs to be addressed.  
Environmental pragmatism provides a better ontological foundation for 
environmental ethics through its adoption of Dewey’s naturalism and a better framework 
for moral deliberation through the application of Dewey’s theory of inquiry and 
valuation. Ben Minteer’s work seeks to make the field’s centerpiece concerns for the 
“public interest” and social justice.  What is left to be done, however, is to describe how 
this nuanced and critical perspective of the “public interest” in addressing environmental 
and social inequalities is not just another step back to purely anthropocentric concerns in 
addressing environmental problems. Alaimo’s trans-corporeality can help temper that 
concern. 
Trans-corporeality and Democratic Naturalism 
Environmental (in)Justice 
The term “justice” has been used often over the course of the argument. In the 
previous section through Minteer’s work on the “public interest,” the notion of what 
social justice was briefly defined:  justice is the result of a democratically sensitive and 
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open inquiry into the causes of problems, the values and interests at play in the situation, 
and the potential avenues to address sociopolitical problems through these causes, values, 
and interests. And so a just act or circumstance is one produced by a certain kind of 
inquiry. This is meant to address what has been highlighted as being disproportionate 
social, and environmental, inequity and harm due to power relations that aim to maintain 
a certain order and hierarchy of social and political power by denying this kind of 
democratic inquiry.  
Defined as such, justice involves a process that involves everyone (i.e. all of the 
related parties) in the process of inquiry based on the idea that if the voices of all those 
involved are heard, the process will be able to, as Dewey describes, “be continuously 
revised” in order “to be appropriate to new tasks” with the tasks likewise being 
continuously re-evaluated in the light of the tools available.111 I argue that the kind of 
focus Minteer puts on social justice as a means to address environmental problems can be 
sharpened by making cases of environmental injustice the priority of environmental 
ethics.  
Julia Rinne and Carol Dinkins define environmental justice as the task “to create 
equal access to ecological resources and equal protection from environmental hazards for 
all persons.”112 The United States Environmental Protection Agency defines it as “the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national 
origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
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environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”113 Their criteria for when it will be 
achieved are “when everyone enjoys: the same degree of protection from environmental 
and health hazards, and; equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy 
environment in which to live, learn, and work.”114 The former address the inequities in 
general. The latter address it as a social, political, and legal project. What will continue to 
raise eyebrows, however, are the seemingly purely anthropocentric concerns of 
environmental justice. While the Pragmatist method does reaffirm certain elements of 
these kinds of notions of justice such as political recognition and procedural fairness that 
seem purely anthropocentric, what it opens the path for, however, is the idea that justice 
and its process is not a fixed target but rather one that must be revised through inquiry as 
circumstances changes. 
A focus on environmental injustice will provide a reminder that environmental 
issues are a consequence of how sociopolitical and environmental circumstances are 
constantly changing and how these changes affect which environmental are affected and 
how. Even if there are Earth-system-affecting phenomena like climate change that are 
bound to affect everyone and everything in some way or rampant and systemically 
harmful environmental practices such as deforestation, pollution, and extinctions, the 
causes are multiple and the affected people and areas are not equally harmed. I believe 
that investigation and action to address environmental injustice should be the centerpiece 
of environmental ethics. This would simultaneously address the sociopolitical power 
dynamics that cause and influence environmental degradation and harm and how 
                                                 





environmental degradation and harm influences and reinforce sociopolitical power 
dynamics. This can best be done with Stacy Alaimo’s description of trans-corporeality. 
Trans-corporeality 
 In her book Bodily Natures, Stacy Alaimo spells out how feminism is taking a 
turn back towards the material. She argues that the linguistic turn, a move thought to be 
able to better navigate the tensions of gender through social construction, is actually an 
escape from the source of the problem of how sharp dualistic distinctions between human 
and nature are the foundations for the sharp distinctions between the masculine and the 
feminine. The material turn, for Alaimo, is a move directed towards investigating the 
materiality of human experience in its relations with its environments, because this frame 
is better at navigating the urgent issues of gender inequality and physical harm 
perpetuated through disparities in environmental health.115 
 Alaimo appeals to trans-corporeality. Her close readings and ecocriticism of 
cultural texts pinpoints where and how examples of trans-corporeality highlight the 
interpenetration and interrelatedness of humans and their environments. She draws upon 
the work of other material feminists116 and speaks of the human body as a “viscous 
porosity” and a “mediating membrane” “which may be biological, social, and political, 
[and] is a powerful model for understanding material interactions in 
scientific/ethical/political terms.”117 As spelled out with Dewey’s naturalism, by 
dissolving the sharp and antagonistic distinction between human and Nature, the 
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experience of environmental problems is not just an abstract violation of moral values but 
material and physical harm created in and through the on-going complex and entangled 
interactions between organisms and their environments. It means to describe the multiple 
levels of importance the exchange of energy and matter have as meaningful and 
purposive communication between lives and places through time and space.  
Trans-corporeality is not, however, just a new materialist or material feminist 
version or application of Dewey’s naturalism. Unqualified naturalism can run the risk, as 
voiced by Dewey’s critics, of homogenizing and potentially flattening out the differences 
in how lives and environments experience and are experienced. What makes trans-
corporeality an integral tool for “democratic naturalism” is how it describes and takes as 
primary how different bodies and environments experience each other differently because 
of different sociopolitical statues caused by sociopolitical power differentials. And when 
the causes of these power differentials influence the unequal exposure and access to 
environmental harms and benefits as a result of being denied a voice in the process of 
democratic inquiry, the result is environmental injustice for humans and non-humans 
alike.  
Dewey of course knew of public health problems in cities due to smoke, garbage, 
and pollution. Minteer mentions environmental justice but only as a public concern that 
should be a part of inquiry into environmental problems. What makes trans-corporeality 
different in how it frames and investigates public health and social problems, however, is 
that it spells out how they are not just human concerns. The most pressing public health 
concerns such as the increasing occurrence of new and unique cancers and chronic 
ailments for those who live adjacent to (petrol)chemical refineries, incinerators, (toxic) 
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dump sites, and agricultural pesticide drift; the effects of hormones and endocrine 
disrupters and antibiotics leaking and leeching into water; and heavy metal release, 
deposition and bioaccumulation into skin, organs, bodies, soils, water, and air are not just 
concerns for the human public. A trans-corporeal investigation would show how human 
and non-human lives and places are adversely affected and would trace the sources to 
long-standing and complex sociopolitical and economic issues demanding immediate 
democratic inquiry for solutions in the public’s interest. 
Trans-corporeality and Democratic Naturalism 
Trans-corporeality gets at something that in many ways Dewey’s naturalism alone 
does not and something Minteer gestures at without fleshing out fully. It understands the 
extent to which the (human) body is psychosocially and ecologically entangled with its 
environments. It acknowledges that not all bodies have to face or experience the same 
environmental fallouts in the same ways because of their social, political, and historical 
positions. And it remembers the fact that all these issues that ail and affect human bodies, 
health, and lives are the very same issues that cause and are caused by deforestation, 
pollution, and extinctions and are involved with the creation and manifestations of Earth-
system-affecting phenomenon like climate change. If environmental ethics is first and 
foremost a practical discipline, it stands to reason that addressing environmental 
injustices in the method suggested would address the environmental problems that the 
non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists and mainstream and radical environmental 
activists want to address (even if the problem-framing is vastly different).  
“Democratic Naturalism” is a method that takes as primary the disproportionate 
harmful effects that socially and historically oppressed groups, communities, and their 
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environments face because of sociopolitically constructed power differentials. How these 
power differentials are (re)produced and reinforced through bodies and environments 
should be the starting point for inquiry and the method for framing the ways and means to 
address socio-environmental problems. To pit the concerns of historically discriminated, 
underrepresented, and underserviced groups and communities of the public in 
environmental health and justice against the supposedly higher moral need to protect 
Nature, its Wildness, and Wilderness and favor the latter over the former at all costs to 
the point of ignoring it in order to maintain a level of philosophical and theoretical 
objectivity and neutrality is tantamount to violence. Alaimo’s description of trans-
corporeality offers a site and framework for identifying what the problems are and why 
addressing them as issues of environmental justice, with its democratic values and 
principles, are not just anthropocentric but are also an environmental ethic (at least in the 
first sense that O’Neill spelled out) in demanding careful inquiry into problems that aim 
at analyzing unequal and unjust power relations among places and lives that affect 
humans and non-humans alike.  
Because if Callicott is suspicious of talk of democracy in environmental ethics 
and environmental problem-solving as being dangerous for being “cryptic,” “insidious,” 
and ironically undemocratic for non-human participants,118 it is only because he  must not 
be talking to the right groups of people. Of course it is the case that democracy as it 
works currently in the United States is not ideal. And it likely never will be. As used here, 
however, democratic inquiry refers to being critically self-aware that there is a myriad of 
perspectives and values that must be taken into account when framing problems and in 
deciding how to best address them. Moreover, it is about realizing that these negotiations 
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do not happen in a vacuum of power relations and that these imbalanced relations 
manifest themselves socially, politically, and environmentally.  
Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists, along with most of the field and 
most mainstream and radical environmental activists, know that there is a gap between 
concerns and actions. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the injustice stems from 
championing methods that are single-minded in their approach to inquiry, silencing 
groups and lives, which cause pre-existing social and environmental inequities to be 
aggravated. Given the strong non-anthropocentric part of the field’s centerpiece of 
intrinsic value, it is methodologically and almost purposely blind to how it does not 
address social inequalities and perpetuates environmental injustice. The mainstream and 
radical activist campaigns are dangerously overly committed to an environmental story 
and narrative that time and again has been shown to be nativist, racist, privileged, and out 
of touch with the concerns and lives of those who cannot visit and commune with Nature 
in its Wildness and Wilderness in the ways prescribed.  
Democratic Naturalism is the commitment to the fact that environmental 
problems are both causes and consequences of social problems and vice versa in a 
feedback loop that will not and cannot be stopped by appeal to and the operationalization 
of some set of values outside the complex situation that needs to be addressed. So if 
environmental ethics and mainstream environmentalism wants to hold true to their 
missions of addressing environmental problems, they must begin to address social 
problems differently (i.e. not through appeal to rigorous conceptual frameworks or 
reductionist environmental legislation such as the ESA).  
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By focusing on environmental justice issues through “democratic naturalism,” I 
believe the field can begin to span the theory-practice gap in a way that addresses the co-
constitutive and reciprocally influential social and environmental problems without fear 
of the “dangerous” anthropocentrism. If championing the environmental “public interest” 
has to do with fewer pollutants, toxins, and environmentally destructive practices 
effecting (human and non-human) bodies, lives, and environments through addressing 
failures to achieve social justice for the most vulnerable groups and communities in 
society by making sure that as many (human and non-human) interests are brought into 





Ethical Environmentalism and Pragmatic Environmental Ethics  
What does it mean to be an environmentalist? What does it mean to be an 
environmental ethicist? At its core, these are the questions I have been investigating. 
More accurately, I have been investigating different answers to these questions. I have 
described a history shared by mainstream and radical campaigns for environmental 
protection, reform, and regulation and the professional academic field of environmental 
ethics – the great American nature writers from the past two centuries and their 
environmental narrative. The majority of those who identify as environmental ethicists in 
the professional academic debate probably also identify as environmentalists. And those 
who identify as environmentalists but who are not part of the professional academic 
discussion still hold some kind of environmental ethic.   
For many, this American environmental narrative heritage takes the form of a 
need to explore the wild and untrammeled Wilderness on a regular basis to commune 
with Nature in order to gain a reverence for it. And through the special power this 
reverence demands, they seek to fulfill a moral obligation to preserve wild Nature, non-
human lives and places, by any and all means possible, legal and otherwise, at all costs, 
and with no compromise. For some others, it takes the form of a professional academic 
debate that delves into the philosophy of the matter in order to prove and describe how 
and why Nature and “the Environment” are worthy of moral consideration. And in doing 




I have argued that for the past 40 years the field of environmental ethics, 
specifically the non-anthropocentrist camp, has been (too) heavily focused on how the 
concept of intrinsic value is supposed to do this work. In fact, I have likened it to being 
stuck on a conceptual merry-go-round, a ride that most of its contributors have the 
privilege treating more like a puzzle. Such a puzzle when solved could provide a “bauble 
to brandish like a lucky charm in the face” of those who stand in the way of 
environmental protection. Such a bauble will change minds and practices by its sheer 
moral force.119 What I have heavily highlighted, however, is the gap between the rigorous 
conceptual analysis of something meant to have strong moral force and the work of 
putting it into practice along with debating the means by which to put it to work in order 
to address and rectify complex environmental problems. This is what most demands 
attention because, after all, “environmental ethics is first and foremost a practical 
discipline” that “should be primarily be concerned with” reasons for and means of 
action.120  
 I have suggested that the concept of intrinsic value fails as a foundation for and as 
a method of moral deliberation in environmental ethics because, at best, it is a lazy 
framework for moral deliberation in that it ignores the entangled sociopolitical and 
environmental complexity of a situation by reducing the answer to a single set of 
predetermined values and interests. And in doing this through the vehicle of legislative 
acts that embody the strongest forms of the concept, it (re)produces and reinforces social 
and environmental injustice. It is an approach that methodologically has lost sight of the 
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fact that every environmental issue is, by definition, a complex socio-environmental 
problem and not just a matter of violating or ignoring the moral value of Nature.  
Losing sight of this is what prompts the reproduction and reinforcement of social 
and environmental injustice. According to Minteer, this is due to a myopic vision of what 
environmental problem-solving should look like academically and sociopolitically. He 
mentions that Eugene Hargrove, the editor of the journal Environmental Ethics, proposes 
that graduate students in public policy be required to take environmental ethics courses to 
counterbalance the dominating force of economics in policy programs.121 Minteer 
believes that the argument needs to run in the other direction as well; environmental 
ethics should be interdisciplinary, looking outside of its philosophical home and strength 
towards other fields to bolster and fill its blind spots.122 The non-anthropocentrist 
intrinsic value camp of the field appeals to biology and ecology often to ground its strong 
moral realist and objectivist claims of mind-independence properties and values. These 
are often the limits to its venturing (along with those who dare to flirt with utilitarianism, 
appealing to economics).  
This is not to say that rigorous philosophical work is not useful; the philosophical 
duty of addressing “discipline-defining questions” such as “answering foundational 
questions, questions such as ‘what sorts of entities are owed moral consideration’” can 
still be part of the inquiry.123 If the philosophical duty of environmental ethics, however, 
stops short of engaging with the sociopolitical dimension because it is of no concern to 
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the moral truth of the matter, then the duties must be redefined. As Minteer states, “when 
ethical critique is necessary, environmental philosophers can certainly provide it, 
although they will be doing so as politically engaged citizens rather than dogmatic 
metaphysicians – or, worse, as environmental philosopher kings;” they do not have 
“special knowledge of the moral and metaphysical truths that must govern communities’ 
relationship with their natural and social environments.”124 Environmental ethicists 
would be part of an interdisciplinary approach to socio-environmental problem-solving 
and not the only way of doing it. Moreover, they must engage with environmental 
problems as engaged citizens aware of and sensitive to the social and political history of 
lives, people, and places.  
Environmental pragmatism begins to do this following Dewey’s theory of inquiry 
and valuation making for a better foundation and method of moral deliberation. Minteer 
pushes this further by building into the framework Dewey’s commitment to democracy 
through focusing the discussion on the “public interest” which takes both the social and 
physical environments into consideration when investigating the situation and framing 
problems. Depending on how a problem is framed, it defines and dictates the possible 
solutions. The results tend to be very different when the problem is framed as an issue of 
violating the mind-independent moral value of Nature versus a matter of social inequities 
in access to environmental protection and benefits. Environmental ethics tends to follow 
the former model of problem-framing. “Democratic naturalism” tries to address both at 
the same time (without the “mind-independent” part, though).  
Of course, the champions of intrinsic value will always be suspicious of any 
human interest being a part of the deliberation process, let alone at the front and center of 
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it. Dewey’s naturalism as the ontological foundation to environmental pragmatism’s 
method begins to address the concerns of anthropocentrism. Bolstered by Alaimo’s 
description of trans-corporeality, it works through the reality that not all humans benefit 
equally from “untampered” economic growth and development; the environmental 
degradation from economic development is not just a non-human concern. “Democratic 
naturalism” takes as primary the power relations that make, reinforce, and embed the 
material disparities between bodies, human and non-human, in constant dynamic 
interaction with their environments.  
Democratic Naturalism for the Delta 
 To return to the concrete example of the California Delta Smelt, what would the 
application of “democratic naturalism” look like when engaging with this complex socio-
environmental problem? It would be no simple task, asking many contentious 
stakeholders and agencies to come together and work cooperatively. As mentioned, the 
issue has to do not just with the Delta Smelt and their numbers but also with century-old 
water rights law, agricultural policy at the state and national level, immigration policy, 
labor policy, public health policy concerning the conditions of the people living in the 
Central Valley communities, industrial and commercial water use regulations throughout 
the state, and regional disputes concerning political clout and power. Their entangled 
character means that in order to address any one of these involves addressing all the 
others. 
 To begin in the Delta itself, the Delta Smelt should continue to be monitored by 
the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the CA Fish and Game Department as an indicator 
species for the health of the Delta. The heavy cultivation of the Delta itself leads to 
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chemical run-off that affects the water quality for both the Smelt and those who live in 
the area. There are environmental justice groups already addressing the use of toxic 
chemicals. The social and political will for addressing toxic fertilizers and pesticides 
already exists and is gaining momentum throughout the Central Valley with institutions 
and associations doing research on alternative farming methods with advocacy groups 
campaigning for a restructuring of how federal and state agriculture bills fund and 
support alternative farming practices.  
 In addition to addressing agricultural and chemical use practices, water rights and 
allocation processes would also have to be changed. The State Water Resources Control 
Board and  municipal water districts throughout the state would have to grapple with the 
fact that almost 60% of the state lives in the Southern 10 counties and are mostly 
dependent on non-local sources of water (and mostly from the Northern part of the state). 
California’s water rights laws would have to be updated to better reflect the current 
population centers and water availability in the face of increasing drought and less 
snowpack. Most water districts already have strong water conservation campaigns. Most 
water use, however, is for industrial and agricultural purposes. These, however, are 
hardly ever addressed when discussing drought mitigation and water conservation. 
Efforts to hold large industrial use of water responsible are already happening.  
 In terms of the lives and livelihoods of those in the Central Valley, there are 
already campaigns that seek to better the working conditions of farmworkers and provide 
better protection for documented and undocumented migrant workers. With better 
allocation of funds in the state assembly and federal Congress, social services can be 
made more readily available for the communities that are most affected by the labor and 
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economic fluctuations in the farmworker market.  The environmental justice groups 
mentioned mobilize communities and lobby for these changes.  
 As is evident, there is much that needs to be done. And most of it is being done 
but in piece-meal. The issue is that when the ESA is used as the problem-framing and 
problem-solving framework, these different campaigns and efforts are not encouraged to 
work in concert to address the systemic issues of which the Delta Smelt is an indicator. 
After investigating the sociopolitical issues at the heart of the problem, “Democratic 
naturalism” would focus on coalition building in order to unite the political will around 
addressing all these different issues. It requires massive governmental inter-agency 
communication and collaboration that is yet to happen. It requires coalition building 
between mainstream environmental groups and environmental justice groups that is, so 
far, lacking.  
What must also be addressed, however, in order to make sure that this method 
does not find its way back to only addressing anthropocentric interests is the question of 
what does justice look like for non-human participants in the process, namely the Delta 
Smelt. It is true that the Delta Smelt may not live past the next 25 years. 125 Even if all 
these campaigns on multiple fronts are successful in the next several decades, the 
likelihood that the Delta Smelt will survive is quite low. Not even following the strong 
intrinsic value method as done by the ESA would the survival of the Smelt be likely. 
Even as the species becomes extinct, the process to save it would not address the larger 
underlying sociopolitical issues. Is “democratic naturalism” a failure if it is unable to save 
the Delta Smelt? I do not think this kind of question is the most useful way of judging the 
success or failure of the method. Justice for the smelt would be it being taken as an 
                                                 
125 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., Federal Register, 59 (242), 65256-65279; CA FISH & G § 2050 - 2115.5 
77 
important factor in the situation, an indicator of the health of the Delta and of the effects 
of the efforts to address all the different aspects of the complex issue. The method cannot 
guarantee its survival. But very little can.  
The method seeks to be able to help foster and build coalitions and multifaceted 
campaigns that recognize and address the sociopolitical power dynamics that influence 
social and environmental injustice. It works to immediately address certain problems and 
to build the social and political resources to be better able to abate other problems as they 
begin to surface. And of course there will be problems that may be unforeseen. Open 
democratic inquiry with a central focus on the most vulnerable bodies and environments 
– human and non-human alike – hopes to minimize the number and degree of unforeseen 
or unseen issues. The health of the Smelt is integral to assessing the state of the 
democratic inquiry and its progress. Even if this is the best “democratic naturalism” can 
do is help build networks of communities and frameworks of idea that are better equipped 
to handle socio-environmental problems as they are happening in the hope of addressing 
them before they happen., it is still better than what the intrinsic value method produces.  
The Task Ahead 
 Reframing environmental ethics with environmental justice as its centerpiece is 
not a panacea, of course. But there is no panacea, no silver bullet, no bauble or lucky 
charm that will easily correct the inexorably entangled complex of socio-environmental 
problems that affect so many lives, human and non-human, in so many places at 
tremendously large scales. Most of those in the non-anthropocentrist intrinsic value 
theory camp will have little to no faith in the sociopolitical route I am championing for 
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environmental ethics either because of continued concerns about anthropocentrism or 
because the sociopolitical route of addressing anything has always been a Sisyphean task.  
For those who fear the former, they need to get out more, and not to the 
mountains to heed their call as Muir did or to the solitary landscape of the desert as 
Abbey did. They need to be sensitive to what it is like to live next to a petrochemical 
plant that releases compounds most chemists cannot even pronounce, gases that sting 
lungs and burn eyes and irritate skin, causing new and unique cancers never before seen. 
These gases change the world of the people living near them by no choice of their own or 
because they have no other choice. These gases, when you take into account how many 
sites where they are released and how many people face their harmful effects, are the 
very same gases that change the atmosphere and change the world at the Earth system 
level. So where is the anthropocentric danger in addressing the environmental health 
concerns of these communities when it would also have to address climate change and 
acid rain and toxins and other by-products that affect the non-human flora and fauna? 
 For those who fear the latter, what else is new? Addressing environmental 
problems will always be difficult, no matter how the problems are framed. I have argued 
that the way non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory frames problems results in efforts 
to circumnavigate the human dimension through legal means by giving non-human lives 
and places legal and moral priority. In doing so, it (re)produces and perpetuates social 
and political problems (often times the very problems that created the environmental 
issue). At least with environmental justice being the focus, the field would immediately 
begin engaging with the sociopolitical aspects of problems and hopefully address 
environmental degradation along with/due to addressing social inequities. This means 
79 
that the field in general, and especially the non-anthropocentrist intrinsic value camp, 
would have to incorporate more political science, legal studies, and other fields while 
also engaging and being a part of the political and social movements that have been 
championing environmental justice for decades. Because if the field and its different 
camps hope to be what Samuelsson says it is – “first and foremost a practical discipline” 
that “should be primarily be concerned with” reasons for and means of action – and to do 
it in a manner that does not (re)produce and reinforce social injustices by ignoring or 
reducing complex situations, it has to begin to work differently.126 If it is to be a practical 
discipline, it must find a new arena for the field, an arena outside of ink and paper and 
into a field that works with communities to address socio-environmental problems as 
concerned and engaged citizens.  
  
                                                 
126 Samuelsson, “Reasons and Values in Environmental Ethics,” 530. 
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